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Kant’s Synthetic and Analytic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason 




In this paper I aim to address Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic 
method in philosophy. I will first consider how some commentators have accounted for 
Kant’s distinction and analyse some passages in which Kant defined the analytic and the 
synthetic method. I will suggest that confusion about Kant’s distinction arises because 
Kant uses it in at least two different senses. I will then identify a specific way in which 
Kant accounts for this distinction when he is differentiating between mathematical and 
philosophical syntheses. I will examine Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure 
Reason with the latter sense of the distinction in mind. I will evaluate if he uses the 
analytic or the synthetic method and if the synthetic method is able to identify, without 
a previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for 
deriving some aspects of our knowledge. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I aim to address Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic 
method and see how it can help us to clarify his lines of reasoning in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. Addressing Kant’s method in the Critique of Pure Reason is an essential 
task in order to understand the aims and results of the book. Moreover, this undertaking 
can help us to better appreciate the status of the conclusions reached by Kant. Kant 
describes the synthetic method as one going from principles to consequences, while the 
analytic method goes the other way around. He then identifies these different 
‘directions’ of philosophical argumentation with a ‘progressive’ and a ‘regressive’ 
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procedure.1 This vague formulation is not easy to interpret. If we here understand as 
principles the principles of the pure understanding and as consequences the aspects of 
our knowledge they are able to justify, it seems easy to conclude that the synthetic 
method should be able to identify, without any previous consideration of some sort of 
given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deducing some aspects of our knowledge. It 
seems so because in the synthetic procedure the ‘principles’ appear to be sufficient to 
deduce ‘conclusions’ on some aspects of our knowledge. On the other hand, the analytic 
method would accept some given aspects of knowledge and identify their necessary 
conditions. As we will see however, when we look closer to Kant’s own arguments, the 
identification of the synthetic method with a procedure avoiding any reference to given 
knowledge in its premises does not seem to be tenable. 
Should transcendental proofs follow the synthetic or the analytic method for Kant? Can 
the synthetic method identify sufficient conditions of knowledge, avoiding any previous 
consideration of given knowledge? Does the Critique of Pure Reason follow analytic or 
synthetic procedures? These are exactly the questions that I would like to answer. 
I will first consider in section 2 how some commentators have accounted for Kant’s 
distinction. Then in section 3 I will suggest that in order to make sense of Kant’s 
contrasting claims we should differentiate a broader and a narrower sense that Kant 
attributes to the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic method. Then in 
section 4 and 5 I will analyse the broader and the narrower sense of the distinction 
respectively. The latter identifies a specific way in which Kant deals with this matter 
when he is differentiating between mathematical and philosophical procedures. To 
finish, I will analyse Kant’s arguments in the Critique of Pure reason with the narrower 
sense of the distinction in mind. I will focus on the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and on 
the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. I will evaluate if he uses the 
analytic or the synthetic method and if the latter is able to identify, avoiding any 
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consideration of some sort of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some 
aspects of knowledge. 
 
2. Guyer, Bird, and Ameriks on the Synthetic and the Analytic Method 
Kant’s distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method has been a continuous 
source of difficulties for many interpreters of the Critique. What is particularly puzzling 
is his claim, made in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, that the Critique of 
Pure Reason uses the synthetic method, while the Prolegomena proceeds analytically.2 
Paul Guyer has argued that Kant’s characterization of the synthetic and the analytic 
method does not mark any relevant difference in the argumentative procedures used in 
the Critique and the Prolegomena.3 Guyer describes the analytic method as one taking 
the necessity and universality of some propositions for granted and identifying which 
conditions are necessary for accounting for those propositions. On the other side, the 
synthetic method avoids any claim of necessity and universality for its premises, even 
though these characteristics would be essential for its conclusions.4 Guyer then claims 
that Kant’s contention in the Prolegomena does not reflect what Kant actually does in 
the two books under consideration. More specifically, the Critique of Pure Reason often 
uses analytic methods, thus taking for granted necessary and universal propositions in 
its premises. Guyer concludes that Kant’s distinction is only a source of confusion that 
reflects the different and contrasting lines of reasoning adopted in the Critique. I agree 
with Guyer that the Critique also proposes arguments that follow the analytic method, 
but I think that Kant’s distinction deserves a closer consideration, especially for 
understanding the differences Kant wants to point out between the Critique and the 
Prolegomena. 
A totally different view is proposed by Graham Bird, who claims that Kant’s distinction 
only refers to the fact that in the Prolegomena Kant examines in details mathematics 
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and natural science, thus grounding his arguments on established sciences, while the 
Critique proceeds from a scrutiny of experience in general not limited to any particular 
science.5 This way of accounting for the distinction between the synthetic and the 
analytic method is surely right in grasping important differences between the 
Prolegomena and the Critique, but a further reflection needs to be carried out. In fact, 
when Kant defines the synthetic and the analytic method in his logic lectures he does 
not consider if the premises come from established sciences or not.6  
Another view on the distinction between an analytic and a synthetic method is proposed 
by Karl Ameriks, who holds that Kant’s main argument in the Critique, that is the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’, is a regressive argument.7 It is Kant himself that 
characterized the analytic method as a regressive method,8 but Ameriks claims that his 
account of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ as a regressive argument does not conflict 
with Kant’s claim in the Prolegomena that the Critique proceeds synthetically. Ameriks 
aims to challenge those interpretations of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ which claim 
that it identifies sufficient conditions of empirical knowledge. To defend his position, 
Ameriks maintains that the distinction between the analytic and the synthetic method 
refers only to the conclusions of an argument, which, in the case of the synthetic 
method, should be synthetic a priori propositions. He then stresses that his account of 
the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ as a regressive argument identifies synthetic a priori 
propositions both in the premises and in the conclusions of the argument, and is thus 
compatible with Kant’s definition of the synthetic method.9 As I have already said with 
reference to Guyer’s account, I think that Ameriks is right in identifying a regressive 
(and in this sense analytic) argument in the Critique of Pure Reason. However, 
Ameriks’ way of distinguishing between analytic and synthetic methods does not reflect 
completely Kant’s own presentation of the issue. In fact, Kant does not identify the 
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synthetic method only by claiming the synthetic a priori character of its conclusions. He 
seems to be also concerned with other characteristics of the argument as a whole.  
What is lacking in these accounts of the distinction between an analytic and synthetic 
method is a close consideration of the different, and sometimes contrasting, meanings 
that Kant attributes to it. Focusing on these different meanings will allow us to 
appreciate how the contrasting claims advanced by these commentators only reflect 
Kant’s different uses of the concepts at issue. We will thus be able to overcome some of 
the problems that arise in relation to Kant’s account of analysis and synthesis. 
 
3. The Different Senses of the Distinction between Analytic and Synthetic 
Methods 
It must be taken into consideration that the distinction between an analytic and a 
synthetic method was not Kant’s invention. It was already discussed by ancient 
mathematicians and it was commonly used by Kant’s modern predecessors and 
contemporaries. 17th and 18th century discussions on the distinction between analytic 
and synthetic methods concerned the procedures to be used in philosophical inquiries 
and demonstrations, and their relationship with mathematics.10 However, at that time 
there was not a unique way to understand and present this distinction. Synthesis was 
often associated with the procedure of Euclidean geometry which starts from 
definitions, axioms and postulates to obtain theorems and problems.11 As an opposite to 
this procedure, one could understand analysis as a process directed toward the 
formulation of definitions and the identification of axioms. Analysis possessed also a 
meaning which was connected to the method of the ancient geometer Pappus. This 
method proceeds by assuming as true the very thing that needs to be proved.12 
Moreover, analysis was used to refer to algebra. Both analysis and synthesis were also 
associated to Lullus’ ‘ars magna’, which was further developed by Leibniz’s ‘ars 
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combinatoria’. In this context analysis identified the process of isolating simple 
concepts, whereas synthesis was the re-composition of them into complex concepts.13  
Given these different senses of synthesis and analysis it is not always easy to discern 
which one is used by the author in question. It is also possible to find different senses of 
the distinction combined together. 
In this regard, Kant makes no exception. As we already noted, in his logic lectures he 
simply stresses that the synthetic method goes from principles to consequences, whereas 
the analytic method proceeds from consequences to principles. This suggests a model of 
synthesis and analysis derived from the Euclidean model. However, Kant’s vague 
formulation can be interpreted in various different ways. The ambiguity in Kant’s use of 
the distinction is confirmed by the fact that sometimes he argues that philosophy can 
proceed only analytically,14 sometimes he stresses that it can also proceed 
synthetically,15 sometimes, as in the Prolegomena, he seems to stress that the whole 
Critique of Pure Reason is synthetic.16 A clue to solve this confusion can be found in 
Kant himself. In fact, in his logic lectures of the 1780’s he identifies different senses in 
which the distinction between the synthetic and the analytic method can be understood. 
Accordingly, after having distinguished analysis and synthesis in the usual way as 
ending and starting with principles, he stresses: 
 
Analytic method is also a means of discovery [Erfindens] and of exposition [Vortrags], in 
that I speak popularly. The true method of exposition is synthetic, however, for even if I 
have thought the thing analytically, the synthetic method is what first makes it a system.17 
 
In addition to the general meanings associated with the analytic and the synthetic 
method, Kant here attributes two other senses at first only to analysis. Thus, analysis 
can be also understood as a method of discovery and as a method of exposition. When 
referring to discovery, Kant has probably algebra in mind, which in mathematics was 
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often associated with a method of discovery and named analysis.18 Nothing further is 
said about discovery and no synthetic method of discovery is discussed. On the other 
hand, analytic expositions are opposed to synthetic expositions, which have the 
characteristic of being systematic. 
An important sense in which Kant understands the synthetic method is thus strongly 
related to a systematic exposition. In this sense, linking synthesis to the derivation of 
conclusions from principles indicates the systematic presentation of a science starting 
from its very basic concepts. However, there is at least another sense in which Kant 
understands the distinction between analytic and synthetic methods and the latter is 
usually introduced when Kant differentiates between philosophical and mathematical 
procedures. In this sense synthesis is related to the possibility of a priori deriving non-
trivial conclusions from concepts thanks to a reference to intuition.19 
That said, I think we can identify two main senses in which Kant uses the attribution 
synthetic with reference to philosophical methods.  In a broader sense, the attribution 
only refers to the form of exposition of Kant’s philosophy, while in a narrower sense, 
used when Kant distinguishes the method of philosophy from that of mathematics, the 
attribution identifies a distinctive line of reasoning. According to the first sense, this 
distinction identifies two different ways following which a theory can be presented. 
Hence, the first Critique is synthetic because it proceeds systematically and shows how 
the whole rests on determinate principles.20 
  
4. The Broader Sense of the Distinction 
As I have already said, the most famous passage in which Kant presents the distinction 
between an analytic and a synthetic method appears in the Prolegomena to any Future 
Metaphysics, where he stresses that the Prolegomena and the Critique of Pure Reason 
proceed using very different methods: 
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In the Critique of Pure Reason I worked on this question synthetically, namely by inquiring 
within pure reason itself, and seeking to determine within this source both the elements and 
the laws of its pure use, according to principles. This work is difficult and requires a 
resolute reader to think himself little by little into a system that takes no foundation as 
given except reason itself, and that therefore tries to develop cognition out of its original 
seeds without relying on any fact whatever. Prolegomena should by contrast be preparatory 
exercises; they ought more to indicate what needs to be done in order to bring a science into 
existence if possible, than to present the science itself. They must therefore rely on 
something already known to be dependable, from which we can go forward with 
confidence and ascend to the sources […]. The methodological procedure of prolegomena 
[…] will therefore be analytic.21 
 
Kant here distinguishes the synthetic method by stressing that it pursues its inquiries 
within pure reason itself, not relying on any fact whatever. This can suggest that the 
method of the Critique consists in identifying, without any consideration of some kind 
of given knowledge, some basic propositions which function as sufficient conditions for 
deriving aspects of our knowledge. Whether this characterization of the method of the 
Critique is adequate or not, what is difficult to explain in this passage is Kant’s 
unspecific claim that the Critique proceeds synthetically, which suggests that the 
‘whole’ Critique is synthetic.  
My suggestion is that Kant, in the Prolegomena, does not use the distinction between 
the two methods in order to identify a specific line of reasoning, but he has in mind two 
different expository strategies. It is sufficient to compare the tables of contents of the 
Critique and the Prolegomena to see how the former is structured according to Kant’s 
division of the human cognitive faculties. In this sense the synthetic nature of the first 
Critique is identical with its systematic structure, which is lacking in the Prolegomena. 
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The Critique is synthetic because it can organize its contents systematically and show 
how they derive from very simple rational principles. The possibility to perform this 
task is what marks the scientificity of the first Critique.22 This sense of synthesis is used 
by Kant also in the Critique of Practical Reason (5: 10). In this text he says that after an 
analytic recognition of the first principles, the matter should be exposed synthetically 
starting from them and descending to their conclusions. In this context the synthetic 
exposition is nothing but the systematic presentation of the contents according to the 
previously identified principles.23 On the other hand, the Prolegomena is organized 
around specific questions (e.g. ‘is metaphysics possible at all?’, ‘how is cognition from 
pure reason possible?’, etc.) which allow us to grasp more easily the problems at stake. 
The fact that Kant, in the Prolegomena, relies on the results of established sciences can 
also be related to a different expository strategy that does not mark an essential 
difference in the argumentative procedure.24  
Unquestionably, Kant also introduces in the passage from the Prolegomena elements 
that suggest two different argumentative procedures (the derivation of the pure laws of 
reason according to principles in the Critique and the reliance on something already 
known in the Prolegomena). This only shows that the different senses of synthesis and 
analysis we are here identifying are not always clearly distinguished by Kant. That said, 
the first purpose of Kant in the Prolegomena could only have been the discrimination of 
two different expository strategies (a systematic presentation relating different 
cognitions to a limited set of principles and a ‘rhapsodic’ exposition introducing 
essential concepts by means of their derivability from well established sciences), 
otherwise it would be impossible to understand how the whole Critique could be 
synthetic.25 This is also suggested by the fact that in the passage from the Prolegomena 
Kant makes explicit reference to a system in connection to the synthetic method. 
Moreover, he stresses that the Prolegomena does not present the science itself, but only 
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shows that a science is possible. Recall that for Kant scientificity is closely linked to 
systematicity. Thus, in this context, the attribution ‘synthetic’ is attributed to the first 
Critique in general and is connected to its systematic structure.26 
 
5. The Narrower Sense of the Distinction 
Besides the broader sense of synthesis identified in the previous sections, following 
which a synthetic exposition is a systematic presentation relating the whole of a science 
to simple principles, Kant uses the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic 
method in at least another, narrower, sense. He does so especially when he discusses the 
differences between the method of mathematics and the method of philosophy. 
Kant started to use the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method in order 
to differentiate mathematical from philosophical inquiries well before the publication of 
the first Critique. In fact, he thought that one of the main mistakes of the school of 
Leibniz and Wolff was the confusion between the method of mathematics and the 
method of philosophy. Kant argued that the mathematical method was unwarranted 
when it was used to obtain conclusions about real existing objects, as the objects of 
metaphysics.27 In 1764, in the so called Prize Essay, which bears the title Inquiry 
Concerning the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality, he 
then argues than while mathematics can proceeds synthetically, philosophy can only 
proceed analytically: 
 
There are two ways in which one can arrive at a general concept: either by the arbitrary 
combination of concepts, or by separating out that cognition which has been rendered 
distinct by means of analysis [Zergliederung]. Mathematics only ever draws up its 
definitions in the first way. For example, think arbitrarily of four straight lines bounding a 
plane surface so that the opposite sides are not parallel to each other. Let this figure be 
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called a trapezium. The concept which I am defining is not given prior to the definition 
itself; on the contrary, it only comes into existence as a result of that definition. […] In this 
and in all other cases the definition obviously comes into being as a result of synthesis. The 
situation is entirely different in the case of philosophical definitions. In philosophy, the 
concept of a thing is always given, albeit confusedly or in an insufficiently determinate 
fashion. The concept has to be analysed [zergliedern]; the characteristic marks which have 
been separated out and the concept which has been given have to be compared with each 
other in all kinds of contexts; and this abstract thought must be rendered complete and 
determinate.28 
 
In 1764 Kant’s strategy for resolving problems that he saw as pressing for the 
philosophy of his times was the suggestion that philosophy could make any 
advancement only if it clarified the method it must use. In this context, Kant uses the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic methods as an essential instrument. Thus, 
whereas mathematics can start its inquiries by defining its concepts thanks to a synthetic 
procedure (which is here connected to an ‘arbitrary connection of concepts’), 
philosophy should always start from concepts already given and obtain its definitions as 
a result of analysis. Mathematics is able to perform this arbitrary connection because its 
concepts have a special relationship with sensibility. Accordingly, Kant argues that ‘in 
mathematics, the object is considered under sensible signs in concreto, whereas in 
philosophy the object is only ever considered in universal abstracted concepts’.29  
These claims can be puzzling if read together with the Prolegomena. In fact, as we saw 
in the previous section, Kant there claims that the whole Critique is synthetic. Of 
course, Kant changed his mind since his Prize Essay in many respects, but it is easy to 
see how the difference with the Prolegomena lies in a change of focus. Whereas the 
Prolegomena identifies two different expository strategies, the Prize Essay tries to 
isolate two different ways of arguing. 
 12 
In the Critique of Pure Reason, especially in the section entitled ‘Discipline of Pure 
Reason in Dogmatic Use’, Kant develops the concepts presented in the Prize Essay and 
introduces some relevant changes. First of all, even if he still considers the different 
ways in which mathematics and philosophy deal with definitions,30 the syntheticity of 
mathematics is not confined to its way of defining,31 but it is something essential to its 
procedures in general, which Kant identifies as ‘constructions of concepts’.32 Moreover, 
here Kant better clarifies the way in which mathematical procedures relate to sensibility. 
He can do so because he has introduced the concept of pure intuition in his 
philosophy.33 Thus, mathematics is synthetic and capable of a priori deriving non-trivial 
conclusions from its concepts because it can immediately relate its concepts to a 
corresponding object in pure intuition by means of constructions. 
With respect to the Prize Essay, in the ‘Discipline of pure Reason in Dogmatic Use’ 
Kant is also more willing to allow a synthetic procedure to philosophy. Thus, he first 
stresses that when the concept of a triangle is given to a philosopher ‘he can analyze 
[zergliedern]34 and make distinct the concept of a straight line, or of an angle, or of the 
number three, but he will not come upon any other properties that do not already lie in 
these concepts’.35 Then, after a couple of pages he adds the specification: ‘there is, to be 
sure, a transcendental synthesis from concepts alone, with which in turn only the 
philosopher can succeed, but which never concerns more than a thing in general, with 
regard to the conditions under which its perception could belong to possible 
experience’.36 
It is true that Kant closes the second reflection of the Prize Essay with an opening to a 
possible future use of synthesis in philosophy,37 however nothing is said about what this 
synthesis amounts to. It is easy to see how Kant, at that time, did not have the means to 
propose a division within synthetic reasoning itself and the synthetic method was thus 
equated with the method of mathematics. On the other hand, in the Critique of Pure 
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Reason Kant thought he had found a peculiar synthetic philosophical argument which 
was different from mathematical synthesis. As we saw, the narrower sense of synthesis 
here presented concerns the possibility of a priory relating a concept to intuition. Even 
though philosophy cannot perform mathematical constructions (immediately relating a 
concept to an object in pure intuition), it is nonetheless able to connect a priori concepts 
to pure intuition, in a very different way from mathematics though. Philosophy cannot a 
priori construct an object in intuition, but it can show how the categories, in relation to 
the pure intuition of time, function as rules that determine the synthesis of the manifold 
in intuitions. It is this possibility to connect a priori concepts to intuition that identifies a 
peculiar philosophical synthesis for Kant.  
With respect to its broader counterpart, this narrower understanding of the distinction 
between the synthetic and the analytic method is closer to the Kantian distinction 
between analytic and synthetic a priori judgments. Accordingly, the syntheticity of 
synthetic a priori judgments is also related to their ability to a priori connect concepts to 
pure intuition.38 However, these two distinctions should not be seen as synonymous or 
equivalent, not least because one classifies judgments and the other methods. In fact, the 
Prolegomena shows that synthetic a priori judgments can be investigated using an 
analytic method.39 That said, it seems plausible to suggest that for Kant the synthetic 
method (in the narrower sense here identified) necessarily involves synthetic a priori 
judgments. In fact, Kant argues that mathematics and philosophy can proceed 
synthetically and they are also able to produce synthetic a priori judgments. 
Recapitulating the results of the latter three sections, Kant uses the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic methods in a broader and a narrower sense. In a broader sense the 
distinction only refer to two different expository strategies, where a synthetic 
presentation is distinctive for being systematic. This is the sense used in the passage 
from the Prolegomena analysed in section 4. According to it, the whole Critique of 
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Pure Reason is synthetic. In a narrower sense, the distinction refers to two different 
argumentative procedures. Thus, the synthetic method is able to a priori derive non-
trivial conclusions from a set of concepts thanks to a reference to pure intuition. On the 
other hand, the analytic method is not able to produce new knowledge, but is only able 
to clarify concepts already given.40 Kant introduces this narrower sense of the 
distinction when he is dealing with the difference between mathematics and philosophy. 
In fact, these two sciences can be distinguished by means of the different ways in which 
they refer to intuition. 
We should now ascertain where the Critique of Pure Reason can be considered 
synthetic according to the narrower sense of the distinction here presented. Moreover, 
we should also see whether Kant’s recognition of a synthetic procedure in philosophy 
involved the possibility of identifying, avoiding any previous consideration of some 
kind of given knowledge, sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our 
knowledge. In order to do so, I will analyse the arguments which Kant proposes in the 
first Critique and I will try to understand how philosophy can argue synthetically. 
 
6. The Analytic and the Synthetic Method in the Critique of Pure Reason 
As far as an analysis of the entire Critique would require a lot more than an article, I 
will limit my inquiry to the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ and the ‘Analytic of Concepts’. I 
will first consider Kant’s arguments for the a priority of space and time. Then, I will 




6.1 The ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ 
In the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ Kant seeks to show that space and time are a priori 
characters of our experience. Moreover, he wants to demonstrate that they are not 
conceptual entities, but have an intuitive nature. If we consider the ‘Metaphysical 
Expositions’ of space and time we can see that they follow a similar line of reasoning. 
First of all they argue that space and time cannot be derived from experience and are so 
a priori representations. Kant presents 3 arguments for sustaining this view:  
(1) space and time cannot be derived from different perceptions but should be 
considered preconditions of having those perceptions, insofar as otherwise we 
could not represent sensations as being outside us and next to one another (A 23 
B 38), or as being simultaneous or successive (A 30 B 46); 
(2) space and time are a priori necessary representations that are conditions of our 
intuitions. Accordingly, we cannot think that there is no space, while we can 
think of a space without objects in it (A 24 B 38-9). As far as time is concerned, 
we cannot think of a phenomenon that is not in time, while we can consider time 
without any phenomenon (A 31 B46);41 
(3) We cannot account for the necessity claimed by geometrical principles ( A 24) 
and by objective relations in time ( A 31 B 47) without recognizing the a priority 
of space and time.42 
Kant then provides two other arguments for stressing that space and time have an 
intuitive nature: 
(4) there are only a unique space and a unique time. All spaces and times that we 
can imagine are necessarily parts of a unique space (A 24-5 B 39) and a unique 
time ( A 31-2 B 49). This can only be explained assuming the intuitive nature of 
space and time; 
 16 
(5) space and time are infinite (A 25, 32 B 39-40, 47-8) and unlimited. Their parts 
can be determined only by limitation of one unique unlimited space (A 25 B 39) 
and one unique and unlimited time (A 32 B 47-8).43 Infinity and unlimitedness 
are characters that cannot belong to concepts but only to intuitions. 
None of these arguments seems to proceed following the narrower characterization of 
the synthetic method I have given in section 5. They do not a priori derive non-trivial 
conclusions from a set of concepts thanks to a reference to pure intuition. They surely 
consider pure intuition as an object, but here pure intuition does not function as a means 
through which we derive non-trivial conclusions from concepts. On the contrary, they 
recognize some features of our representations of space and time as given and claim 
that, given those features, space and time cannot but be a priori and intuitive. These 
arguments identify some characteristics of our experience and then point out some 
conditions that are necessary to account for those characteristics. The conditions so 
identified are necessary conditions for explaining the characteristics in questions and 
they cannot be isolated without a previous consideration of some aspects of our 
knowledge taken as given.44 The structure of the arguments presented in the 
‘Metaphysical Expositions’ of space and time thus proceeds as follows: 
(a) our representations of space and time possess characteristics X, Y and Z; 
(b) we could not account for X, Y and Z without recognizing that space and time 
are a priori and have an intuitive nature; 
(c) therefore, space and time are a priori intuitive representations. 
The ‘Transcendental Expositions’ of space and time45 added in the second edition of the 
Critique do not present a substantially different line of reasoning. Both texts are 
fundamentally an elaboration of point (3) of our presentation of the ‘Metaphysical 
Expositions’. They show that we cannot account for synthetic a priori propositions in 
geometry and in our representation of motion if we do not accept space and time as pure 
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intuitions. We can thus conclude that the arguments given in the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetic’ for proving the a priority and intuitive nature of space and time are 
fundamentally analytic. In fact, they accept some features of our representations as 
given and then isolate which conditions are necessary in order to account for them. 
There are many issues that can be raised in connection with these arguments, but for 
now it is sufficient to recognize that Kant’s arguments in the ‘Aesthetic’ are analytic 
and that they can identify necessary conditions of some aspects of our empirical (and 
mathematical) knowledge taken as given. We should now analyse the ‘Analytic of 
Concepts’ seeking a synthetic argument in it. 
 
6.2 The ‘Analytic of Concepts’ 
As I have stressed above, Kant presents the synthetic method, in the narrower sense, as 
a procedure a priori deriving non-trivial conclusion from concepts thanks to a reference 
to intuition. The so-called ‘Metaphysical Deduction’ of the Categories seems to be one 
candidate for finding a synthetic procedure in the first Critique. In this section Kant 
identifies the fundamental forms of judgments and classifies them in a table.46 He then 
obtains a table of fundamental categories which applies the fundamental forms of 
judgments to the synthesis of intuitions.47 Kant begins with a logical consideration of 
judgments and then draws some conclusions regarding our concepts of objects. This 
seems to adhere in some way to Kant’s description of the synthetic method in the 
narrower sense.  
However, there are some factors that prevent us from accepting this account. The 
‘Metaphysical Deduction’ is not able to prove any truth concerning our representation 
of objects in intuition by itself. It identifies the categories, but it does not warrant the 
use of these categories in experience. It is only through the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ 
that the table of the categories, identified in the ‘Metaphysical Deduction’, is able to 
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show its relevance for human experience and knowledge. It is thus in the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’ that we must seek a synthetic argument in Kant’s sense. 
In this paper I will focus on the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. This 
text results from Kant’s reconsideration of one of the main arguments in his Critique 
taking into consideration the reactions received by the first edition. It is thus more 
careful in presenting the argument in a clear manner. There is now much agreement in 
dividing the argument offered in the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ 
in two steps, even though the details of these steps are widely debated.48 The first step 
ends at § 20, while the second step terminates at § 26. The first step shows the necessity 
of the categories and of the unity of apperception as conditions for having objective 
representations. On the other hand, the second step takes into account our particular way 
of intuiting sensible objects and shows how the categories can be objective for beings 
having human sensibility. I think that this division of the argument is correct and can 
also help us in identifying where Kant’s argument proceeds synthetically, and so begin 
my analysis of the first step of the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. 
It is impossible to present Kant’s ‘Transcendental Deduction’ without also proposing an 
interpretation of the argument. I will thus avoid analysing the argument word by word 
(a task that would be too long for this article) and will instead schematize the basic 
points that best represent the line of reasoning provided in the first step of the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’. The argument can be summarized as follow: 
(d) the combination of a manifold into a concept of an object cannot be derived 
from the senses, but is an act performed by the knowing subject (§ 15, B 129-
30); 
(e) this act of combination presupposes the representation of a synthetic unity of the 
manifold (§ 15, B 130-1); 
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(f)  this synthetic unity cannot be the category of unity, insofar as the former must 
ground the combination of the manifold provided by the categories themselves 
(§ 15, B 131); 
(g) the representation ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all the representations of 
a knowing subject (§ 16, B 131-2). The recognition of this unity of the knowing 
subject rests on a synthetic unity as an activity of the subject (synthetic unity of 
apperception) (§ 16, B 133-4); 
(h) only the synthetic unity of apperception makes possible the combination of the 
manifold of intuitions into the concept of an object and is thus a necessary 
condition of this combination (§ 17, B 136-8); 
(i) the manifold of intuitions is brought under the synthetic unity of apperception 
through objective judgments (§ 19, B 141-2). These judgments must conform to 
the fundamental forms of judgments identified in the ‘Metaphysical Deduction’; 
(j) the categories result from the application of the fundamental forms of judgments 
to the manifold of intuitions (§20, B 143); 
(k) thus, the categories are necessary conditions for the combination of the manifold 
of intuitions into the concept of an object (§20, B 143). 
If this schematization of the first step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ were correct, 
Kant would present an analytic argument that identifies necessary conditions for the 
combination of the manifold of intuitions into the concept of an object. The 
combination of a manifold of intuitions into the concept of an abject is simply 
something we do in experience. Given the existence of this combination, the categories 
are recognized as its necessary conditions. Here we cannot find a reference to the 
peculiar way in which humans intuit a priori; a reference which allows the a priori 
derivation of non-trivial conclusions from concepts. The combination of the manifold is 
accepted as given and the categories are recognizes as its necessary conditions. The first 
 20 
step of the transcendental deduction would thus follow the analytic method and this is 
confirmed by Kant’s claim that the proposition stating that the synthetic unity of 
apperception is the objective condition of every knowledge is analytic (B 138). This 
way of presenting Kant’s argument renders it less problematic than it is often supposed 
by many commentators. Of course, the details of the argument still present various 
points that deserve close attention, but the argument can be defended more easily 
because it is ‘modest’ in scope. 
 Thus, neither the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’, nor the first step of the ‘Transcendental 
Deduction’ present synthetic arguments in the narrower sense identified above and they 
recognize necessary conditions for given aspects of knowledge. Let us now consider the 
second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. It is not easy to understand what this 
section is intended to obtain.49 It is common to see the second stage of the ‘Deduction’ 
as taking into account the particular way in which humans intuit objects, a reference that 
is neglected in the first stage. However, there are various possible ways of interpreting 
this latter claim. In my reading, the second step aims to show that not only conceptual 
combination, but also sensible combination, must conform to the categories. Kant 
shows this dependence of sensible combination on the categories thanks to a reference 
to pure intuition (and to time in particular). Kant’s strategy consists in showing that the 
synthesis of apprehension, that is the activity through which we can perceive objects in 
space and time, rests on a pure synthesis of intuition, which in turn must conform to the 
synthesis of apperception and thus to the categories of the understanding. It must be 
noted that this latter claim is not identical to the contention that the categories are 
directly employed in sensible apprehension. Rather, Kant’s claim is better understood as 
stressing that every sensible representation, insofar as it depends on the synthetic unity 
of apperception, is obtained in a way that necessarily accords with the categories, even 
if the categories are not yet employed in a judgment.50 The possibility of this pure 
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intuitive synthesis that accords with the categories without directly employing them 
rests on Kant’s account of the relationship between the understanding and the 
imagination. This is an essential point to fully understand the second step of Kant’s 
‘Transcendental Deduction’, but it is also one of the most problematic elements in 
Kant’s Critique. It would deserve an in-depth analysis that this article cannot offer and 
it would also divert our attention from the main purpose of this study.51 I will thus limit 
my reference to the role played by the imagination to what is essential to understand 
Kant’s argument. We can summarize the argument in the second step of the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’ as follows: 
(l) the possibility of representing space and time as unities containing a manifold, 
and thus the possibility of representing any sensible relation within those unities, 
cannot rest on space and time as forms of human intuition (§ 26, B 160-1, 160-
1n.); 
(m) the synthesis of apprehension (which is responsible for the unity of space and 
time as pure formal intuitions and consequently for the unity of every 
representation in space and time) can only be performed (thanks to the 
imagination) according to the synthetic unity of apperception (§ 26, B 161); 
(n) therefore, the synthesis of apperception is a condition of  every synthetic unity in 
experience (conceptual or sensible alike) (§ 26, B 164-5); 
(o) since the synthesis of apperception proceeds according to the categories, any 
unity in space and time resulting from the synthesis of apprehension (which 
must accord with the synthesis of apperception) must also accord with the 
categories (§ 26, B 164-5). 
Following this reconstruction of § 26 of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, the second 
step of Kant’s argument is intended to show that also sense perception, insofar as every 
unity and relation in spatiotemporal perception rest on a pure intuitive synthesis, which 
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in turn must accord with the categories, has to conform to the categories (even though 
indirectly, through the mediation of the imagination).52 If even sense perception is 
indirectly subjected to the categories, it means that they are conditions of experience, 
insofar as no unity in experience would be possible without them. 
According to this reconstruction, the structure of the second step of the ‘Transcendental 
Deduction’ is not so different from the first step. Kant assumes that we perceive 
intuitive relations in space and time, and space and time themselves as intuitive unities. 
Then, he argues that this undertaking would be impossible without making reference to 
the synthesis of apperception and the categories. It thus seems that also the second step 
of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is analytic and identifies the categories as necessary 
conditions of experience and empirical knowledge. 
However, the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ presents a peculiarity that 
is really important to Kant. At this stage, Kant is able to find a necessary connection 
between the synthesis of apperception and the categories (which depend on the 
understanding), and a pure synthesis of intuition (which belong to sensibility). If we 
recall Kant’s own words when he introduced the only possible synthesis that was 
achievable by a philosopher, it is easy to see that he probably had in mind the argument 
presented in this section of the ‘Deduction’. In fact, in the ‘Discipline of Pure Reason in 
Dogmatic Use’, in the context of his discussion of the limits of philosophical synthesis, 
he stressed that: ‘there is, to be sure, a transcendental synthesis from concepts alone, 
with which in turn only the philosopher can succeed, but which never concerns more 
than a thing in general, with regard to the conditions under which its perception could 
belong to possible experience’.53 The synthesis that a philosopher can perform proceeds 
‘from concepts alone’, because it is not a mathematical construction of concepts. This 
does not mean that philosophy can be synthetic ignoring the conditions of human 
intuition. On the contrary, a philosophical synthesis must in some way make reference 
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to intuition in order to be referable to ‘possible experience’. Accordingly, Kant, in 
refuting the possibility to have axioms in philosophy, argues that: ‘a synthetic principle 
[…] e.g., the proposition that everything that happens has its cause, can never be 
immediately certain from mere concepts, because I must always look around for some 
third thing, namely the condition of time determination in an experience, and could 
never directly cognize such a principle immediately from concepts alone’.54 This means 
that a category, in order to be consider a synthetic principle, must make reference to the 
condition of time determination according to the intuitive synthesis we have just 
identified.55 This intuitive synthesis should not be confused with mathematical 
constructions, insofar as it is not able to produce actual objects of intuition. It is a 
determination of our intuition of time which allows us to perceive objects in accordance 
with the categories when they are given to us in actual experience. This is confirmed by 
Kant himself when he says that a category ‘contains nothing but the synthesis of 
possible intuitions’,56 and so it cannot produce a concrete object in intuition, as 
mathematics does, by means of a priori constructions.  
Philosophy is indeed able, according to the narrower sense of the synthetic method 
identified above, to a priori derive objectively valid conclusions starting from concepts 
(in this case: the categories). It can only do so by making reference to our forms of 
intuition and to a pure intuitive synthesis. This pure intuitive synthesis is discernible by 
a philosophical inquiry that rests on analytic procedures. Philosophy shows how every 
perceptual synthesis rests on a pure intuitive synthesis, which in turn depends on the 
synthesis of apperception. The categories, which are the means trough which objects are 
related to the synthesis of apperception in judgments, can thus allow us to derive non-
trivial conclusions about our way of synthetizing intuitions in experience. Revealing the 
possibility to perform this derivation is exactly the result of the second step of the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’. That means that the immediate connection between 
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concepts and pure intuition possible in mathematics is not reachable by philosophy. In 
order to perform its derivation of conclusions concerning possible experience (thanks to 
a reference to pure intuition) from the categories, the Critique is thus obliged to first 
identify a priori conditions of experience (belonging to intuition and the understanding 
respectively) by means of analysis.57 This is what Kant does in the ‘Transcendental 
Aesthetics’ and in the first step of the second version of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. 
It is so evident that philosophical synthetic arguments are quite different from the 
synthetic procedures of mathematics. The latter can immediately derive non-trivial 
conclusions from definitions and a priori identifiable concepts, the former can only 
recognize, as a result of their line of reasoning, the possibility of a priori deriving non-
trivial conclusion from the categories.58 This is a relevant point to take into account in 
evaluating Kant’s own version of transcendental philosophy. 
Of course, Kant’s argument for showing how the categories relate a priori to intuition 
presents various difficulties and obscurities, especially concerning the role of 
imagination in determining our perception in accordance with the categories.59 
However, we can also see that the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, an 
argument that Kant himself presents as synthetic, is ‘modest’ in scope. It cannot be seen 
as identifying, avoiding any previous consideration of some sort of given knowledge, 
sufficient conditions for deriving some aspects of our knowledge. In fact, even if it 
shows how we can a priori (but indirectly through a reference to a pure intuitive 
synthesis) derive some non-trivial conclusions concerning our knowledge and 
experience from the categories, it rests on the analytic arguments developed in the 
‘Transcendental Aesthetics’ and in the first step of the second version of the 
‘Transcendental Deduction’. The latter are analytic arguments taking as given some 
aspects of our experience and knowledge. That is to say, in order to a priori derive from 
the categories aspects of our knowledge thanks to a reference to pure intuition, we must 
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first recognize the categories and space and time as necessary conditions of our 
knowledge and experience. As we saw, this task is performed by the analytic arguments 
that I have just recalled.    
 
6. Conclusion 
Following the reflections carried out in this paper, it is possible to draw some 
conclusions concerning Kant’s use of analytic and synthetic methods in the Critique of 
Pure Reason. 
First of all, it cannot be argued that the Critique proceeds only following a synthetic 
method, unless one uses the broader understanding of the synthetic method that we have 
identified in the Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics. According to the latter, the 
distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method only refers to two different ways 
of exposition used in the Critique and the Prolegomena respectively. Bird correctly 
emphasizes this sense of the distinction.60 Accordingly, the Critique is synthetic thanks 
to its systematic character.61 However, this sense cannot be employed to account for 
those passages in which Kant seeks to differentiate mathematical and philosophical 
synthesis. 
Guyer is thus right when he stresses that in the Critique we can find both analytic and 
synthetic arguments,62 but he uses a description of the synthetic method that is too 
demanding, and thus concludes that the argumentative procedures of the Critique are 
inconsistent. According to his presentation, synthetic arguments avoid any claim of 
necessity and universality for their premises and are able to obtain necessary and 
universal propositions as conclusions. However, we have seen that when Kant attributes 
a synthetic method to philosophy he seems to have in mind the recognition of the 
possibility of a priori deriving some conclusions concerning our experience and 
perception from the categories, thanks to a reference to pure intuition. This recognition 
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is the result of the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, which presupposes 
the identification of space and time as a priori intuitive representations and the 
recognition of the categories as conditions of the combination of the manifold of 
intuitions into the concept of an object. As I have stressed above, Kant identifies these 
elements of our knowledge by following an analytic procedure. Thus, Kant’s method in 
the Critique should be seen as a coordination of analytic and synthetic methods. The 
analytic stages of Kant’s argument identify necessary conditions in our sensible and 
conceptual representations, while the synthetic stage is able to show a necessary 
connection between the latter and the former. In this respect, the different arguments we 
have analysed in section 6 are different steps of a unique argument.  
The analytic steps take for granted some characteristics of our knowledge and 
experience and then identify which conditions are necessary to account for those 
characteristics. These conditions should depend on our subjective standpoint on the 
object. Contrary to what we were expecting, the synthetic step of Kant’s argument in 
the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ must be regarded as part of this general strategy. It 
cannot be equated with an identification of sufficient conditions of knowledge which are 
identified without a previous consideration of given aspects knowledge. On the 
contrary, this synthetic step presupposes the isolation of the necessary conditions of our 
knowledge by means of analysis. 
If we read Ameriks’ claim that the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is regressive as arguing 
that it takes some aspects of our experience as given and identifies which conditions are 
necessary to account for them (according to the description of the analytic method I 
have used in this paper),63 we can surely agree with him. However, we should add to 
this analytic step of the deduction, a synthetic one: a step capable of putting together the 
results of the ‘Transcendental Aesthetics’ and those of the first stage of the ‘Deduction’. 
Accordingly, synthetic philosophical arguments are not able to identify, avoiding any 
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consideration of given characteristics of knowledge, the categories as sufficient 
conditions for deriving some aspect of our knowledge. The peculiarity of these 
arguments resides in their capacity to identify necessary relationships between the 
categories and their schemata in pure intuition.64 
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1 ‘Analytic is opposed to synthetic method. The former begins with the conditioned and grounded and 
proceeds to principles (a principiatis ad principia), while the latter goes from principles to consequences 
or from the simple to the composite. The former could also be called regressive, as the latter could 
progressive’ (9: 149). References to Kant’s work, if not differently indicated, will be given according to 
the standard edition (1900-), indicating volume and page number. References to the Critique of Pure 
Reason will use A and B to refer respectively to the paging of the first and the second original editions. 
2 4: 263, 274-5. 
3 Guyer 1987: 6-7, 80. 
4 Guyer 1987: 6. 
5 Bird 2006a: 134-5. 
6 9: 149. 
7 Ameriks 2003. 
8 9: 149. 
9 Ameriks 2003: 59-60. 
10 See Tonelli 1959; 1976. 
11 This is for example the picture of the ‘mathematical’ or ‘scientific’ method that Christian Wolff 
famously proposed as a model for philosophical inquiry. On Wolff’s method see: Gomez Tutor 2004. 
However, as noted by Engfer (1982: 227; 1986: 53-4), Wolff only rarely uses the designations: synthetic 
and analytic method. 
12 Pappus 1986: 82-4. 
13 Engfer (1982) discusses the different meanings of analysis and synthesis in the 17th and 18th century at 
length, giving particular attention to Descartes, Leibniz, Wolff and Kant. Also De Jong (1995: 241) 
identifies three different senses attributed to the distinction between analysis and synthesis.  
14 See for example the so called Prize Essay of 1864 (2: 276). 
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15 As he argues in the Critique at A 719 B 747. See also 24: 779. 
16 4: 274-5 
17 Kant 1998: 492-3, Eng. tr. 419.  
18 See Engfer 1986: 54. In a passage from the Prolegomena, (4: 276n) even though Kant usually 
associates mathematics to the synthetic method, he also speaks about a mathematical analysis, thus 
bringing the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method within mathematics. This is only one 
example of the way in which Kant’s claims on this issue can generate confusion. 
19 I will say more on this in section 5. 
20 See also McBay Merritt 2006. It is true that Kant also stresses that the first Critique cannot be 
considered a system, but only the preparatory work for such a system (B xxxvi). However, it is evident 
that with respect to the Prolegomena it follows a systematic presentation.  
21 4: 274-5. 
22 See McBay Merritt 2006. It is true that for Kant we should distinguish systematicity of thought and 
systematicity of exposition. Systematicity of thought is the possibility to show systematic relationships 
really existing between cognitions. Systematicity of exposition concerns the presentation of these 
relationships. That is to say, a systematic exposition is possible only because there is a systematicity of 
thought. However, we can present something that is thought systematically in a non-systematic way (and 
this seems to be the case of the Prolegomena) (On this matter see: Kant 1998: 489-91, Eng. tr. 416-7). 
Systematicity of exposition is a means to show the systematicity of thought and can be the mark of 
science. 
23 The fact that this exposition requires a previous analysis here means that the rational principles on 
which the system is built are not immediately at hand. 
24 This would also explain the fact that in the second edition of the Critique Kant introduces arguments 
coming from the Prolegomena. If the Critique had had a totally different argumentative structure, this 
introduction would have undermined the solidity of its results. In fact, as I will try to show later, even 
when the Critique does not take the results of particular sciences for granted, it often identifies 
characteristics of our experience and regressively determines which are their conditions. This way of 
arguing is very similar to the one used in the Prolegomena. 
25 The fact that here two different expository strategies are at stake is confirmed by another passage in the 
Prolegomena: ‘Here then is such a plan [given by the Prolegomena (my note)] subsequent to the 
completed work [accomplished by the Critique (my note)], which now can be laid out according to the 
analytic method, whereas the work itself absolutely had to be composed according to the synthetic 
method, so that the science might present all of its articulations, as the structural organization of a quite 
peculiar faculty of cognition, in their natural connection’ (4: 263). 
26 Bird’s claim (2006a: 134-5) that the distinction between a synthetic and an analytic method only refers 
to the reliance of the Prolegomena on established science well expresses this sense of the distinction. 
27 See Beiser 1992: 40-1. 
28 2: 276. ‘Zergliederung’ here refers to analysis, as it is clear from this passage: ‘I have sought to show in 
a short and hastily composed work [the Prize Essay] that this science [metaphysics] has […] remained 
imperfect and uncertain because the method peculiar to it has been misunderstood. Its method 
[Verfahren] is not synthetic, as is that of mathematics, but analytic [analytisch]’ (2: 308). 
29 2: 292. 
30 A 727-32 B 755-60. 
31 Wolff-Metternich (1995: 36, 150) correctly shows how in the Prize Essay mathematics can only obtain 
concepts synthetically through definitions. The subsequent judgments which use those definitions are 
analytic in form. 
32 A 713 B 741. 
33 The distinction between concepts and intuitions was already introduced in the brief essay Concerning 
the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space (2: 375-83) and  it was also considered 
in the so called Inaugural Dissertation (2: 385-419).   
34 That ‘zerglidern’ is here immediately connected to analysis is clear from a passage on definitions that 
comes later: ‘the former [philosophical definitions] come about only analytically through analysis 
[analytisch durch Zergliederung] […], while the latter [mathematical definitions] come about 
synthetically’ (A 730 B 758). 
35 A 716 B 744. 
36 A 719 B 747.  
37 2: 290. 
38 See B 15-7 for the relevance of intuition for synthetic a priori judgments in mathematics and geometry, 
and A 155 B 194 for the relevance of the intuition of time for a priori synthetic judgments in general. 
39 The argumentative procedures of the Prolegomena can be considered analytic in the narrower sense 
here presented. In fact, I will argue later in this paper that the argument we can consider synthetic in the 
first Critique is to be found in the second step of the B ‘Transcendental Deduction’. There is not an 
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equivalent of this argument in the Prolegomena. Thus, even if the Critique inquires ‘how are synthetic a 
priori judgments possible?’ (B 19) it could coherently answer to this question analytically. It could do so 
by assuming that there are synthetic a priori judgments in experience and science and by clarifying these 
judgments through analysis. 
40 Confront the passage from the Prize Essay with A 718 B 746. 
41 It must be borne in mind that while time is a condition of all phenomena, space is only a condition of 
external phenomena. 
42 This point is removed form the ‘Metaphysical  Exposition’ of space in the second edition and is 
addressed in the ‘Transcendental Exposition’. 
43 Kant actually introduces the argument that different spaces can only be limitation of an unlimited space 
at (4) (A 25). 
44 To be sure, it could be claimed that the a priori intuition of space can function as a sufficient condition 
for obtaining basic geometrical truths, but this is too strong a claim, since we would also need to define 
fundamental geometrical concepts. Moreover, the elaboration of synthetic mathematical truths is not the 
task of the philosophical arguments given in the Critique. With respect to geometry, philosophy can only 
recognize the necessary conditions for obtaining its synthetic a priori truths. In this respect, Kant argues 
that the philosopher is not able of drawing any synthetic conclusion from mathematical concepts (A 716-7 
B 744-5). 
45 B 40-1, 48-9. 
46 A 70-6 B 95-101. 
47 A 76-83 B 102-9. 
48 See Henrich: 1969; Allison 1983: ch. 6; Bird 2006b: ch. 14; Pereboom 2001. 
49 Accordingly, various interpretations of this step have been proposed: Henrich 1969; Allison 1983: ch. 
6; Bird 2006b: ch. 14; Pereboom 2001. 
50 The difference between these two claims can be grasped thanks to one of Kant’s examples. At B 163-4 
Kant claims that we can perceive the freezing of water only by identifying relations in time that accord 
with the category of cause. This does not mean that in the perception of the freezing of water we are 
already subsuming our experience under the category of cause. We are not yet performing a judgment 
which attributes the concept of cause to this experience. On the contrary, our temporal perception of the 
freezing must accord with the rules governing the synthesis of apperception, even if concepts of the 
understanding are not directly employed yet. Our perception must be able to be subjected to a judgment 
involving the categories (in this particular case the category of cause). The fact that our spatiotemporal 
perception accords with the categories is due to the mediating role of imagination explained at § 24 (B 
150-6.), in the chapter on ‘Schematism’ (A137-47 B 176-87) and elsewhere, but this is too vast an issue 
to be addressed here. 
51 For an account of Kant’s concept of imagination see: Ferrarin 1995a; 1995b. 
52 As I have already stressed, this is not equal to say that the categories are directly employed in sense 
perception, but that the pure intuitive synthesis carried out by the imagination results in relations that 
necessarily conform to the categories, even if the categories are not used in a judgment yet. 
53 A 719 B 747. 
54 A 732-3 B 761. 
55 Accordingly, as noted by Wolff-Metternich (1995: 155-6), philosophical principles can only be 
indirectly synthetic. See also A 248. 
56 A 719 B 747. 
57 This accords with Kant’s attempt to show, in the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, how the categories can 
be used to derive synthetic conclusions only within possible experience. The impossibility, in philosophy, 
to derive anything from the categories, before this limitation is established, prevents the direct use of the 
categories as sufficient conditions of knowledge. 
58 Also McBay Merritt (2006: 528-9) stresses that the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’ is 
synthetic because it is able to connect a priori concepts to intuitions. However, according to her 
description of the synthetic method, the latter is able to ‘grasp the idea of the whole correctly and from 
this to see all those parts in their reciprocal relation to one another by means of their derivation from the 
concept of that whole in a pure rational faculty. This is the “synthetic” stage of inquiry’ (McBay Merritt 
2006: 527). This seems to adhere more closely to the broader sense of synthesis I have previously 
identified, following which the Critique is an exposition of the powers of reason starting from very basic 
principles. This task cannot be limited to the second step of the ‘Transcendental Deduction’. According to 
it the whole Critique is synthetic, insofar as it follows the internal division of Reason’s faculties. It seems 
to me that if we want to determine in which sense only the second step of the Deduction is synthetic we 
need to apply the narrower understanding of the synthetic method, which is used by Kant when he 
distinguishes between mathematics and philosophy. 
59 The role of imagination is further clarified in the chapter on the ‘Schematism’ and in the ‘Principles’ of 
the understanding. The estimation of Kant’s arguments for the role of imagination in our perception 
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should thus not be limited to the ‘Transcendental Deduction’, but should also take into account these 
sections of the Critique. 
60 Bird 2006a: 134-5. 
61 See McBay Merritt 2006. 
62 Guyer 1987: 6-7, 80. 
63 Ameriks 2003: 59-60. 
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